Abstract-The shrew distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack is very detrimental for many applications, since it can throttle TCP flows to a small fraction of their ideal rate at very low attack cost. Earlier works mainly focused on empirical studies of defending against the shrew DDoS, and very few of them provided analytic results about the attack itself. In this paper, we propose a mathematical model for estimating attack effect of this stealthy type of DDoS. By originally capturing the adjustment behaviors of victim TCPs congestion window, our model can comprehensively evaluate the combined impact of attack pattern (i.e., how the attack is configured) and network environment on attack effect (the existing models failed to consider the impact of network environment). Henceforth, our model has higher accuracy over a wider range of network environments. The relative error of our model remains around 10% for most attack patterns and network environments, whereas the relative error of the benchmark model in previous works has a mean value of 69.57%, and it could be more than 180% in some cases. More importantly, our model reveals some novel properties of the shrew attack from the interaction between attack pattern and network environment, such as the minimum cost formula to launch a successful attack, and the maximum effect formula of a shrew attack. With them, we are able to find out how to adaptively tune the attack parameters (e.g., the DoS burst length) to improve its attack effect in a given network environment, and how to reconfigure the network resource (e.g., the bottleneck buffer size) to mitigate the shrew DDoS with a given attack pattern. Finally, based on our theoretical results, we put forward a simple strategy to defend the shrew attack. The simulation results indicate that this strategy can remarkably increase TCP throughput by nearly half of the bottleneck bandwidth (and can be higher) for general attack patterns.
Traditional DDoS attack degrades network services by flooding overwhelming data streams from hundreds of thousands of infected hosts (or so-called zombies). These flooding DDoS attacks not only need a mass of resources but also present obvious statistical anomalies to network monitors, thus they can be easily detected and defended by existing DDoS defense strategies [1] , [2] . Contrarily, the low-rate DDoS attack can throttle the victim with very few attack resources. Shrew attack [1] and RoQ attack [2] are two typical types of the low-rate DDoS attacks. Since there have been several mathematical models [2] , [3] for the latter already, this paper will mainly focus on the former. Shrew attack exploits the deficiencies in TCP's retransmission timeout (RTO) mechanism. It assaults legitimate TCP flows by periodically sending high rate packet streams in a low frequency that matches RTO. So every time the TCP senders recover from timeout, they will immediately encounter serious congestion on the bottleneck link and have to enter timeout again. As such, the overall throughput of legitimate TCP flows could be extremely low, or even nearly zero [1] . Considering the popularity of TCP in today's Internet, a majority of existing applications and commercial services are at great risk. For instance, [4] showed how this attack resets Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)'s routing session to cause routing instability, unreachable destinations and traffic performance degradation.
Recently many strategies have been proposed to defend against shrew attack, which could be categorized into two major types. The first type is to directly detect the malicious hosts who launch attacks, so that their packets can be filtered out and the services can be resumed to the legitimate users [5] [6] [7] . The second type is to mitigate the attack damage without detecting the attacker, but through modifying TCP itself [1] or intelligently scheduling packets in the bottleneck buffer [8] , [9] to ensure that well-behaved TCP sessions can retain their bandwidth shares under attack. Unfortunately, neither of them is able to completely defend shrew attack. The former ones could be eluded by shrew attacks with a large amount of zombies or low sending rate, since under such attacks a defense system usually cannot collect enough packets from a host (more accurately, an IP address) to determine whether this host is malicious. And the latter ones become less effective while encounter shrew attacks with TCP-friendly flows [10] or some other smart attack schemes [11] , as in these cases the malicious flows also seem "well-behaved".
To substantially solve the above problems, we need to investigate shrew attack in detail from two aspects, i.e., an 1556-6013 © 2014 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
analytic model and simulation validations in various network scenarios. For instance, if the above detection strategies could analytically derive the minimum transmission rate of attack packets, then they would have prevented some low-rate attacks from being undetected by adjusting the minimum number of the packets required to detect a malicious host. The mathematical model proposed in [1] is one of the most popular models for shrew DDoS research, which predicts attack effect in terms of TCP throughput from attack pattern. However, [1] built its model on two oversimplified assumptions. First, [1] assumed that the bottleneck link would instantly overflow once the malicious hosts begin attack. Second, [1] assumed that TCP flows can immediately utilize the full link capacity after an RTO. In essential, [1] almost ignored the behaviors of TCP's congestion window adaption. The problem is that TCP throughput (attack effect) is determined by TCP's congestion window, while the latter is supposed to be adapted according to network environment (such as the flow's delay, the bottleneck bandwidth, and etc). Since [1] ignored TCP's congestion window adaption, inevitably it failed to consider the impact of network environment on TCP throughput. As a result, [1] 's model is rather inaccurate in many network environments, e.g., when the TCP flows have large delays, as mentioned in [1] itself and demonstrated by our simulation results. Even worse, the inaccurate model further leads to several inaccurate conclusions in [1] . A widely-applied one is that the inter-burst period should always be 1 second to maximize the attack effect. This conclusion underestimates the stealthy nature of shrew attack, for the inter-burst period maximizing attack effect actually depends on the network environment and is usually larger than 1s (though it can be very close to 1s in certain cases). The subsequent models proposed in [12] [13] [14] also have the similar inaccuracy issues as they were revised from [1] 's model and ignored TCP's congestion window adaption likewise.
Tuning attack effect is definitely one of the most important issues for both shrew attacker and defender. But as discussed above, many key properties about shrew attack's effect, such as how attack effect is influenced by network environment, how to maximize or minimize attack effect in a given network, cannot be revealed accurately by the existing models. This situation motivates us to model attack effect in a more precise way. Unlike previous works of [1] , [12] [13] [14] that only predict attack effect from attack pattern, our model takes into account TCP's congestion window adaption behavior by introducing the idea of "rounds", so it can comprehensively evaluate attack effect from the joint impact of attack pattern and network environment. It has three main advantages over the model of [1] (we take [1] 's model as the benchmark since other models ignored TCP's window behaviors likewise). Firstly, the model of this paper can predict attack effect with higher accuracy in general. In particular, our model achieves a mean relative error of 10.34%, whereas the model in [1] has a mean relative error as high as 69.57%. Secondly, our model can be applied in more scenarios. Although [1] did not explicitly restrict the situations where its model could be used, the two assumptions it made determine that the model is inapplicable in some situations, e.g., when the assaulted TCP flow has large delay.
The simulations illustrate that [1] 's predictions have a relative error even higher than 180% when the one-way delay is 90ms (a situation very common in the Internet [15] ). Reversely, our proposed model keeps being accurate regardless of attack patterns and network settings. Thirdly, our model considers more factors that influence attack effect (such as TCP flow's delay, the bottleneck bandwidth, and etc), so it can uncover more crucial properties of shrew and consequentially provides us more instructions for defending shrew DoS. For example, from the proposed model we first derive the highest effect that could be achieved by shrew DoS and the lowest cost to launch a successful attack. Then these analytic results instruct us how to tune the attack parameters to improve attack effect in a given network environment, and how to reconfigure the network resources (e.g., the bottleneck buffer size) to mitigate a given shrew DoS attack. At last with the above deductions, we design a simple defense strategy that protects the legitimate TCP flows by temporarily increasing the bottleneck buffer size while under attack. Simulation shows that this strategy will recover the flows' throughput by nearly half of the bottleneck capacity for general attack patterns. We believe more useful conclusions can be drawn from our model, and eventually these conclusions will help us develop more robust defense strategies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes some premises about IP network, TCP and shrew attack. In section III, we deduce a mathematical for predicting attack effect under given attack configuration and network setting. In section IV we expand our model to derive two key configurations of the attack parameters, and further deduce the interaction between attack pattern and network environment. In section V, we setup some simulation scenarios to validate our model and to compare it with the one of [1] (as the essential reason for the latter's inaccuracy, i.e., the ignorance of TCP's window behaviors, is still followed by all the subsequent models). In section VI we discuss a simple defense strategy based on our analytic results. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PREMISES AND DEFINITIONS

A. The Premises for Network Scenario
We directly use the co-existing model for TCP flows and DoS attack flow proposed by [1] (shown in Fig. 1 ), which consists of a single bottleneck queue driven by N long-lived TCP flows with various RTTs and a DoS flow (distributed DoS flows can be regarded as an aggregated attack flow for they act collaboratively). Assume that the bottleneck bandwidth (i.e., the bottleneck link's capacity) is C, the bottleneck buffer size is B, and the bandwidth from the senders to the bottleneck is much larger than C. In addition, the one-way propagation delay of the i -th flow is denoted by d i , so the roundtrip time (RTT) of thei -th TCP flow is the time spent in the bottleneck queue plus 2d i .
We assume that the bottleneck queue is FIFO. Under this queuing policy, any arriving packet would be discarded if and only if the buffer is full. As a matter of fact, common AQM mechanisms (e.g., RED) cannot make any notable difference under shrew attack, as proved in [1] . We also assume that the reverse link is never congested for simplicity.
B. The Premises for TCP
We deduce our model based on TCP New Reno [16] for its popularity in the Internet today. Let b be the average number of acknowledged packets by each received ACK. Known from [16] , [17] , after receiving a packet, TCP receiver would delay returning ACK unless (a) it receives another subsequent packet of the same TCP flow; or (b) the ACK is a duplicate ACK; or (c) there are some data being ready to feed back to the TCP sender, which can piggyback the ACK; or (d) the ACK has been delayed for a certain period of time which we denote as D. Therefore b may vary from 1 to 2 for different application layer protocols. For instance, b = 2 if an application only has data transmission in one direction, and b < 2 if the application has data transmission in both directions.
We introduce the concept of "round" to simplify our later analysis about TCP congestion avoidance mechanism. A round starts with the back-to-back transmission of W packets and ends when all the W packets are correctly transmitted, where W is the current size of the TCP congestion window (cwnd). The next round starts as the sender receives the first returning ACK for one of these W packets.
Based on the concept of "round" and the definition of b, if all of W packets in one round are received and acknowledged correctly, then W/b ACKs will be received. According to [17] , the TCP sender will transmit W + W/b packets totally in the next round if it is in slow start phase, since each ACK increases cwnd by 1. Otherwise, the sender will transmit W + 1/b packets in the next round if in congestion avoidance phase, since each ACK increases cwnd by 1/W . As such, TCP's sliding window mechanism can be more easily described in terms of round.
At last, we assume that TCP sender's window size is not limited by receiver's advertised flow control window. To eliminate application protocol's impact on packet transmission, we also assume that TCP sender always has data from the application layer to send.
C. The Premises and Definitions for Shrew Attack
Shrew attack can be essentially modeled as a square-wave in a time sequence form with the following three parameters, i.e., period of the attack T , length of the peak L, and magnitude of the peak R, as shown in Fig. 2(a) [1] . Thus, we may specify a shrew attack by a triple <T, L, R>. We refer to the short duration of an attacker's loss-inducing bursts (the "on" period of a square-wave) as "outage". Suppose that an outage starts at t = 0. For any given time t > 0, we define X t to be the number of the legitimate packets successfully transmitted in the interval [0, t] . Then the long-term steady-state throughput (denoted by P) of the legitimate TCP flows during the attack, can be normalized by the bottleneck bandwidth C as:
We use the above normalized throughput P to evaluate the effect of a shrew DoS attack. By nature the range of P is [0, 1], and lower P means better attack effect for attacker. Another classical low-rate DDoS attack, RoQ, can also be viewed as square-wave stream. But unlike shrew attack that utilizes TCP's timeout mechanism, RoQ assaults TCP flow by periodically forcing the victim to invoke fast retransmission (then the victim would halve its cwnd and enter congestion avoidance phase) [2] . Note that making a TCP New Reno sender timeout requires massive packet losses, whereas provoking the sender's fast retransmission only needs one packet loss [16] . Therefore, we can differentiate between shrew and RoQ through the number of the packet losses induced by them. In particular, if an attack can always create massive packet losses to make the sender invoke timeout, then it is definitely shrew. If the attack sometimes makes the sender timeout but at other times lets the sender enter fast retransmission, we consider the attack more like a RoQ, since in this case the number of the packet losses may be insufficient for provoking timeout yet is surely sufficient for provoking fast retransmission. If the attack can only create a few packet losses and let the sender enter fast retransmission, then it is definitely RoQ. And if the attack cannot induce any packet loss, it is neither shrew nor RoQ. To summarize, we have the following definition for shrew attack:
Definition 1: A DoS attack is a successful shrew attack if and only if it can force the TCP senders timeout after every outage. Fig. 2 (b) depicts the typical congestion window adaption behavior of a legitimate TCP sender under a successful shrew attack. From Fig. 2 we can see that a successful shrew attack must have burst rate R high enough to fill the bottleneck buffer and induce packet loss, burst length L long enough to invoke timeout, and inter-burst period T large enough to keep the average attack rate RL/T low.
Although theoretically the three attack parameters <R, L, T > are all tunable, [1] suggested that the ideal burst magnitude R of a shrew attack should always equal to the bottleneck bandwidth C. Indeed, if R < C, the victim would have too much time to react, and if R > C, it would result in a waste of attack resources [1] . We will follow this guideline in this paper.
III. THE MODEL FOR DERIVING ATTACK EFFECT
In this section we formally propose our model. It aims at analytically deriving the attack effect (the victim throughput P) from the network settings (bottleneck buffer size B, bottleneck bandwidth C, the number of TCP flows N, and the delays of TCP flows d i ) and the attack parameters (burst length L, inter-burst period T , and burst magnitude R = C). Certainly, such model is very important for revealing the properties of shrew DDoS, since launching a successful attack is basically making a trade-off between attack cost and attack effect.
We model the attack effect in 3 steps from specific to general. At start, we consider a particular scenario in which the network only has one TCP flow. Next, we extend the model to the scenario of homogeneous-RTTs flows. Finally, we generalize the model for the scenario of heterogeneousRTTs flows.
A. Our Basic Model for Single Flow Scenario
The modeling process for the attack effect P in the baseline single-flow scenario can be further decomposed into three substeps. We first express P by some intermediate parameters, then derive these intermediate parameters from the known parameters including the network settings <B, C, N, d> and the attack parameters <L, T, R> (the definitions of the commonly used parameters are in Table I ), at last deduce proper ranges of the attack parameters. As such, we model attack effect P as a function of the network setting and the attack pattern.
1) How to Express the TCP Throughput P by the Intermediate Parameters W k and n:
Here we conduct the first sub-step of our modeling process, i.e., expressing the TCP throughput (the attack effect) P by intermediate parameters.
A basic problem is: what should we choose as the intermediate parameters?
Before solving this problem, let us review Fig.2 and see that the TCP sender's window adaption behavior will repeat for every inter-burst period T while under a successful shrew attack. Thus, the long-term steady-state normalized throughput P equals the average TCP throughput within [0, T ] as follows:
where X T is the number of the legitimate packets successfully sent in the interval Fig. 3 . The network status during an inter-burst period T . The upper part is the TCP sender's cwnd as a function of the time t. The lower part is the bottleneck queue length as a function of the round-packet pair (r, p), e.g., (r, p) = (k, 1) means the transmission of the first packet in the k-th round. The upper part and the lower part correspond with each other, e.g., (r, p) = (k, 1) happens when t = 0. We will explicitly explain the meaning and the derivation of the parameters in the deduction process.
suppose the outage starts at t = 0, while the TCP sender is sending its first packet of the k-th round (the first round begun when the sender entered slow start phase) and the bottleneck queue length is Q 0 . Also, we suppose the arrival of the m-th packet of the (k + n)-th round fills the bottleneck buffer at t = T f ull . Observe that X T as the total packets sent in [0, T ], relies on the sender's cwnd in each round (denoted by W i for the i -th round), which relies on cwnd when the window stops sliding (W k+n in Fig. 3 ), which then relies on cwnd when the outage begins (W k ) and the number of rounds to fill the bottleneck buffer (n). Moreover, the value of W k and n depends on the network setting and the attack pattern (the known parameters). Hence, we decide to choose W k and n as the intermediate parameters.
Now we express the attack effect P by W k and n as follows. As mentioned earlier, the shrew attack's peak rate R is equal to the bottleneck bandwidth C, which means that the attack needs exactly B − Q 0 packets from the legitimate sender to fill the unoccupied buffer B − Q 0 . So the sender can successfully transmit B − Q 0 packets from the time when the outage begins (t = 0) to the time when the buffer overflows (after that, all the packets will be dropped). Furthermore, note that the packets sent from the slow start to the beginning of the next outage (t = T ) is in fact the packets sent from the first round to the (k − 1)-th round. Thus X T , as the packets sent in [0, T ], satisfies
The queue length at t = 0, Q 0 , can be deduced from W k (the cwnd at t = 0) as below. Because the burst length required to create outages in slow start phase is too large for a "low-rate" attack (will be proved later), we consider that the sender should be in congestion avoidance phase at t = 0. In addition, because the k-th round begins just at t = 0, only the first packet of the (k −1)-th round is acknowledged. Therefore, the sender's cwnd
where d is the TCP flow's one-way propagation delay), there exist 2dC packets (or their ACKs) in the forward and the reverse link, while the other packets are being queued in the bottleneck buffer. In this case the queue length Q 0 is W k − 1/b − 2dC. Otherwise, if W k 1/b < 2dC, Q 0 should be 0 as the sender's transmission rate is lower than C. In summary, Q 0 is expressed by W k as:
W i (cwnd in the i -th round) in (2) can be derived as below. As shown in Fig. 3 , the bottleneck buffer is filled by the m-th packet of the (k + n)-th round at t = T f ull , implying that all the packets in the (k + n − 1)-th round are sent successfully whereas the packets sent after the m-th packet in the (k + n)-th round are dropped. Consequentially, the sender's cwnd is W k+n = W k + n/b while entering timeout state (at "stop sliding" in Fig. 3 ). Then we can express the number of the packets sent in the i -th roundW i by W k and n according to TCP's congestion window adaptation mechanism:
By substituting (2)- (4) into (1), we are able to express the TCP throughput P by W k and n.
2) How to Derive the Intermediate Parameters W k and n From the Network Setting and the Attack Pattern: Next we derive W k (the packets sent in thek-th round) and n (the number of rounds to fill the buffer) from the known parameters including the network setting and the attack pattern. To reach this goal, we need two equations in which all the parameters except W k and n are known.
We find the first equation by studying how the attack pattern affects W k and n. Specifically, we divide an attack period T into four phases (see Fig. 3 
is the time at which the bottleneck buffer overflows, T stop is the period from the buffer overflows to the TCP sender stops sliding window, and T r is the interval between the beginning of the first round and the beginning of the k-th round. That is, the attack period T = T f ull + T stop + RTO + T r . The burst magnitude R being equal to the bottleneck bandwidth C means that the packets from the attacker are just enough to keep the bottleneck queue length unaltered. Thus, as the TCP sender's last successfully transmitted packet reaches the bottleneck link at the time t = T f ull , there will have been (B − 1) packets queuing in the bottleneck buffer. Apparently, the ACK for this packet will return to the TCP sender (B − 1)/C + 1/C + 2d later, and afterwards the sender's window will stop sliding. Henceforth, the interval between the buffer overflows and the sender's window stop sliding is T stop = B/C + 2d. Besides, in usual TCP/IP networks, RTO always equals its predefined lower bound minRTO [1] , [18] . Based on the above analysis, we refine the inter-burst period T to be:
The above (5) will help us derive W k and n only if we could express T f ull , T r by W k and n. We begin with T r , namely the time for the sender to recover its cwnd (see Fig. 3 ).
Let T rtt (i) be the time period from the beginning of the i -th round to the beginning of the (i + 1)-th round. Consider the first packet of the i -th round for 1 ≤ i < k. This packet itself requires 1/C to be transmitted by the bottleneck link. In addition, the sender's cwnd is W i−1 when the packet is sent. Therefore, if W i−1 /C > 2d, the packet would arrive at the bottleneck link with (W i−1 −1−2dC)/C packets being queued ahead of it, in this case T rtt
, the packet will not be queued at all, so T rtt (i) = 2d + 1/C. In general, we have T rtt (i) = max {2d + 1/C, W i−1 /C} when i > 1. As for i = 1, recall that an ACK will be at most delayed for D and each ACK acknowledges b packets in average. Hence the ACK for the first packet of the first round has a probability of (b − 1) to be delayed for D, meaning the average delay for this ACK is
With the above results about T rrt (i) and the fact that T r is the interval between the beginning of the first round and the beginning of the k-th round (when the outage starts), we can express T r by W k and n as:
T f ull in (5) should also be expressed by W k and n. As shown in Fig. 3 , the bottleneck buffer overflows as the m-th packet of the (k + n)-th round arrives at t = T f ull , That is, T f ull consists of three parts, i.e., the starting time of the (k + n)-th round (denoted by t S(k+n) ), the sending interval between the first packet and the m-th packet of the (k + n)-th round (denoted by T I (k+n,m) ), and the propagation delay between the TCP sender and the bottleneck link (denoted by d ). Since the assaulted bottleneck link is usually on the TCP receiver's LAN [1] , d can be approximated to d. It follows that
Our task becomes expressing t S(k+n) , T I (k+n,m) by W k and n. The starting time of the (k +n)-th round t S(k+n) satisfies the following iteration equation, where T Q(k+n) is the queuing time of the first packet in the (k + n)-th round:
Recall that the burst magnitude is equal to the bottleneck bandwidth. It implies that every packet sent by the TCP sender during an outage would increase the bottleneck queue length by 1. Also note that the bottleneck queue is already Q 0 when the outage begins at t = 0. So as the first packet of the (k + n − 1)-th round arrives at the bottleneck, the queue length is the sum of Q 0 and the number of packets sent from the k-th round to the (k + n − 2)-th round. In addition, the packet itself needs 1/C to be transmitted by the bottleneck link. Thus the total queuing time of the first packet of the (k + n − 1)-th round would be
We substitute the above expression of T Q(k+n) into the earlier iteration equation of the (k + n)-th round's starting time t S(k+n) , and then use this refined iteration equation and the fact that t S(k) = 0 (the k-th round starts at t = 0) to derive t S(k+n) :
According to (7), our next move is to derive T I (k+n,m) , i.e., the interval between the time when the (k + n)-th round starts and the time when the m-th packets are sent. This can be done by deriving the sending interval between any two back-to-back packets of the (k + n)-th round. To start with, we cluster the W i packets of the i -th round into W i /b groups. The b packets within a same group are triggered by the same ACK. When 1 < i < k (i.e., before an outage starts), the limited bottleneck bandwidth C determines that any two consecutive groups in the i -th round would reach the TCP receiver at an interval of b/C. Thereby the two ACKs for these two groups would return to the TCP sender at an interval of b/C, and correspondingly trigger two new groups sent in the (i + 1)-th round at an interval of b/C. Now consider two back-to-back groups, which we denote by P1 and P2, in the k-th round. From the above analysis, we know that P1 would be sent b/C earlier and then enters the bottleneck queue b/C earlier than P2 does. Also note that the attacker are transmitting packets at the rate of R = C. As a result, when P2 arrives at the bottleneck link, there will have been P1 as well as b attack packets queuing in the bottleneck buffer, as shown in Fig. 4(a) . The FIFO bottleneck queue means that P1 leaves the queue 2b/C earlier than P2 does. Thus the former's ACK feeds back to the sender 2b/C earlier. Then successively triggered by the ACKs for P1 and P2, two new groups of the (k + 1)-th round, which we denote by Q1 and Q2 and refer to as the offspring groups of P1 and P2, are sent at an interval of 2b/C and accordingly queued in the buffer as shown in Fig. 4(b) . At last Q1 leaves the queue 3b/C earlier than Q2, and so on.
In general, for the offspring groups of P1 and P2 in the (n +k)-th round, the former one is sent (n +1)b/C earlier than the latter one is, whereas the b packets within a same group are sent simultaneously. 
From (7), (8) and the above expression of T I (k+n,m) , we can express T f ull by W k and n as:
We let the item n i=3 , m) , which is very close to 0 in most cases. Based on (5), (6) and (9), the burst period T satisfies:
Apart from (10), the derivation of W k and n requires another equation in which all the parameters except W k and n are known. This second equation can be found by studying how the network setting affects W k and n. As Fig. 3 illustrates, the outage starts at the beginning of the k-th round (at this point, the bottleneck queue length is Q 0 ), and the buffer is overflowed by the m-th packet of the (k + n)-th round. On the one hand, the TCP sender transmits [
With (10) and (11), we can resolve W k , n, and m (which are all natural numbers) from the known parameters. Then we substitute them into (1)- (4), and obtain the TCP throughput P:
Although (12) does not explicitly express the throughput P as a function of the period T for (10) and (11) are insufficient to resolve the explicit expressions of 3 variables (W k , n, and m), it is still able to reveal many useful properties of shrew attack, as we will discuss in the section IV.
3) How to Determine the Range of the Burst Length L: According to (12) , the burst length L has no direct influence on the attack effect P. Nevertheless, L must be set within a proper range for the success of the attack.
The upper bound of the outage length L is obviously infinite, since longer outage can always cause more packet losses. However, the lower bound of L is not so obvious. We only know that it should be large enough to induce sufficient packet losses and eventually force the sender invoke timeout [16] . The problem is: how many packet losses are "sufficient" to provoke a TCP New Reno sender's timeout? Moreover, how long is "enough" for an outage to induce the "sufficient" packet losses?
The answer to the first question is as follows. Theoretically, after the first packet loss occurs (at t = T f ull ), the shrew attacker can at most let two packets from a TCP New Reno sender be transmitted successfully (which results in two duplicate ACKs) before the sender avoids timeout [16] . In reality, however, the attacker should better strangle all the legitimate packets rather than intentionally allowing one or two of them pass through, as there may be a few packets supposed to be discarded occasionally getting through the bottleneck. So we consider that the outage length L needs to be large enough to clog all the legitimate packets after t = T f ull .
Then we answer the second question. Revisit Fig. 3 and observe that t = T f ull +T stop is the time when the TCP sender stops transmitting new packets (as the sender stops sliding its window). Hence, if the outage length L < T f ull + T stop , some of the legitimate packets from the sender could still get through the bottleneck link, which might let the sender avoid timeout as we analyzed above. Contrarily, if L ≥ T f ull + T stop , all the legitimate packets sent after t = T f ull would be dropped, which ensures that the sender has to timeout. To summarize, L's lower bound for launching a successful shrew attack is T f ull + T stop . As T stop is known to be B/C + 2d and T f ull is derived in (9) , it follows
where W k , n, and m can be resolved from (10) and (11). The right side of the above inequation, denoted by L * T , provides the conditional minimum burst length of a successful attack when given the inter-burst period T . Since the bottleneck buffer is filled by the m-th packet of the (n + k)-th round, m is usually larger than b(b ≤ 2). We might further
It can be seen that the outage must last longer (larger L * T ) if the TCP sender has a smaller cwnd when the outage starts (smaller W k ). As a result, shrew attacker usually should not create outages when TCP sender is still in slow start phase.
So far we have derived attack effect P in (11) for any pairs of (L, T ) as long as L ≥ L * T . We will not derive P for L < L * T since in this case the attack cannot succeed (see definition 1).
B. Extend Our Model to Homogeneous Flows Scenario
The model proposed in the previous subsection is only applicable in networks with one TCP flow. Here we extend our model for networks with N identical-delay flows. Obviously, the previous single-flow scenario is a special case of the homogeneous-flows scenario with N = 1.
When TCP always has sufficient data from the application layer to send, the only difference between TCP flows is their delays. Specifically, if two TCP flows have an identical delay, their behaviors related to congestion control will be exactly synchronous. They enter slow start to increase their cwnd at the same time, fill the buffer in a same way, and if they meet timeout, they will simultaneously enter slow start again.
This phenomenon enlightens us to regard the N identical-delay flows (suppose the delay is d) as a collective TCP flow with a delay of d. Of course, such collective flow has a unique property, i.e., its datagram size is N times as large as a normal TCP flow's.
Based on the above analysis, we can extend the mathematical model in the previous subsection to derive the N flows' throughput. Here, we do not put a special emphasis on the detailed deductions but directly show the results as follows.
Firstly, W i and T rtt (i) can be derived as:
Then W k and n are obtained from the two equations below:
Finally, the TCP throughput (namely, the attack effect) P is:
where the burst length L must meet:
C. Generalize Our Model for Heterogeneous Flows Scenario
We further extend our model for the most general scenario that contains N TCP flows with delays of
This heterogeneous-flows scenario actually covers the previous two scenarios as its subset. Directly deriving attack effect in such scenario is rather difficult in that the flows would adjust their congestion windows asynchronously. Fortunately, a conclusion in [19] , which suggests the bottleneck bandwidth is shared by long-lived TCP flows in an inverse proportion of their delays, allows us to convert a heterogeneous-flows scenario into an equivalent homogeneous-flows scenario. Then we can easily derive attack effect from the model in the previous subsection.
We begin the scenario conversion by equivalently replacing an arbitrary flow, say the k-th flow (whose delay is d k ), with N dk flows whose delays are all d. By "equivalently", we mean that such replacement will not alter any other flow's bandwidth share. More precisely, if the bandwidth share of the j -th flow before the replacement is C j and after the replacement is C j , then we should have C j = C j for 1 ≤ j ≤ N, j = k.
To find out the suitable d and N dk for the above equivalence requirement, we first note that C k and C j satisfy C k /C j = d j /d k according to [19] , namely,
Analogously, after the k-th flow being replaced by the N dk homogeneous flows (whose delays are all d), the bandwidth share of the j -th flow C j becomes: Moreover, our analytical results in the previous subsection show that the number of TCP flows (N) has a great impact on attack effect P. Thus, this number must not be changed during the replacement, i.e., 
With (19), we convert the original N-heterogeneous-flows scenario into a homogeneous-flows scenario which has N flows with an identical delay of d. Then we can derive the attack effect P by applying the extended model in the previous subsection. The remaining derivation is omitted here.
IV. THE KEY CONFIGURATIONS OF SHREW ATTACK AND THE INTERACTION BETWEEN ATTACK PATTERN AND NETWORK ENVIRONMENT
The above model for attack effect can further reveal several key configurations of shrew's triple parameters, including the conditional minimum DoS period for given burst length T * L and the global minimum burst length L min . These configurations provide us not only the proper ranges of the DoS period and the burst length for launching a successful shrew attack, but also the answers to two unsolved issues about shrew DoS, namely, how to maximize attack effect and how to minimize attack cost. With them and our mathematical model, we can tune shrew DoS to improve attack effect and decrease attack cost for given network, and in turn reveal the way of reconfiguring the network resources (such as the bottleneck buffer) to mitigate shrew DoS with given attack pattern.
A. The Conditional Minimum of DoS Period T * L and the Conditional Minimum of TCP Throughput P *
L
Sometimes an attacker must set the peak length L to a predefined value, such as when it intends to elude RED-PD [11] . Under these situations, how to configure the attack period T so that (a) the attack is successful and (b) the attack effect is maximized would be very important for the attacker.
Given the burst length L, a larger burst period T will result in larger cwnd when an outage begins (i.e., larger W k ) since the TCP sender will have more time to grow its cwnd, as indicated by (13) and (16) . In turn, if we know the conditional minimum of W k (denoted by W * L ) that ensures the success of the shrew attack for the given L, then we are able to derive the conditional minimum T (denoted by T * L ) accordingly. We resolve W * L , n, and m from (15) and (18), then substitute W k = W * L , n, and m into (16) to derive T * L as follows:
As will be proved later, the TCP throughput P declines with the decrement of the DoS period T , as long as the attack is still successful. In fact, from the derivation of (20) we know that the attack is always successful if only T ≥ T * L . Henceforth, the conditional minimal P for the given L (denoted by P * L ) can be calculated by substituting T * L into (17) .
For single-flow scenario or homogeneous-flows scenario, d in (20) and (21) is the delay of TCP flow(s). And for heterogeneous-flows scenario, d is the equivalent delay resolved from (19) .
Recall that [1] simply ignored the time of overflowing the bottleneck buffer and the time of recovering congestion window. Apart from the inaccurate model for attack effect P, such ignorance leads to another widely applied yet inaccurate conclusion in [1] , that is, the attacker should set its period T = minRTO to launch a successful shrew attack. This conclusion overestimates the average rate for a successful attack, as we have demonstrated the minimum value of T given the burst length L should be T * L > minRTO in (20) . Moreover, the simulation results (not shown here) indicate that setting T = minRTO will lead to poorer attack effect compared to T = T * L in many (if not all) cases. Thus, the conclusion of T = minRTO not only overestimates attack rate but also underestimates attack effect, which means many defense strategies based on this conclusion may be in fact less effective than they were claimed. We intend to further study this problem in future works.
At last, the analytic expression of the maximal attack effect in (21) can also be employed to quantify the vulnerability of a network system while encountering shrew attack, as suggested in [20] . Unlike attack effect, vulnerability studies low-rate attacks from the network's view, so it provide novel insights into defense systems, e.g., comparing the effectiveness of different defense strategies. Deeper discussion is omitted here.
B. The Global Minimum of Burst Length L min and the Lowest Average Attack Rate A min
The configuration to achieve the lowest average attack rate (denoted by A min ) is another crucial issue that both attacker and defender will concern. With it an attacker can estimate the minimal cost to assault a network. In turn, a defender can testify his defense system with lowest-rate shrew DoS, considering most counter-DoS mechanisms are vulnerable to sufficiently-low-average-rate attacks [1] .
The configuration achieving A min involves two parts, i.e., the minimal burst length L (denoted by L min ) and the maximal burst period T (denoted by T max ). We start with deriving L min . Note that L has a conditional minimum (L * T ) to launch a successful shrew attack for every given T , as (18) indicates. Naturally, the minimum of L * T would be the global minimal burst length L min we are looking for. According to (18) , L * T reaches its minimum when W k = B + 2dC+N/b (so that cwnd = B + 2dC as outage begins) and n = 0, so we have
In single-flow scenario or homogeneous-flows scenario, d in (22) is the delay of the TCP flow(s). In heterogeneousflows scenario, d is the equivalent delay resolved from (19) .
An important conclusion drawn from (22) is that the global minimum length L min is irrelevant with the value of T . In other words, a shrew attack certainly will not succeed if its burst length L < L min regardless of its period T .
Next we discuss the maximum burst period T max . From (20) we can see that the period T has no upper bound if merely the success of the attack is required. Hence, T max is simply infinity (which is usually meaningless since in this case the attack effect is extremely poor) unless other requirements like the intended attack effect are specified.
At last, the lowest average attack rate A min is:
C. The Interaction Between Attack Pattern and Network Environment
With the above analytic results, now we study the interaction between attack pattern and network environment, i.e., how to improve attack effect and decrease attack cost in given network, and how to mitigate shrew attack with given attack pattern.
We first explore how the DoS period T affects attack effect P by calculating the partial derivative of P in (12) with respect to T . Without losing generality, we only consider single-flow scenario for simplicity. When W k < 1/b + 2dC (where W k is the sender's cwnd in the k-th round), P = ( (12) . Besides, ∂(B)/∂(T ) = 0 since the buffer size B is irrelevant with the period T . It follows:
TCP's window adaptation mechanism determines that a TCP sender would continually increase its transmission rate until it fully utilizes the bottleneck link. Thus we have (
, where T r is the time period between the beginning of the first round and the beginning of the k-th round, and W k−1 /2d is the sender's rate during the (k−1)-th round. Furthermore, the TCP sender would experience growing queuing delay during an outage, as illustrated in Fig. 4 . So once the outage starts (at the beginning of the k-th round), the sender's transmission rate would keep declining, that is B/T f ull ≤ W k−1 /2d, where T f ull is the period between the outage starts (at this point the buffer is empty because W k < 1/b + 2dC) and the buffer overflows. These two inequations about T r and T f ull , combined with T = T f ull + B/C + 2d + T r + minRTO (see Fig. 3 ), lead to
By letting T increase by a small value T (where T > 0), we can see that the physical meaning of ∂(
is the sender's transmission rate during the k-th round. Thus,
From (23), (24) , and (25), we deduce that
Reversely, if W k ≥ 1/b + 2dC, the TCP sender's transmission rate would equal the bottleneck bandwidth C when an outage starts. As (9) and (10) indicate, the time that the attacker takes to fill the bottleneck buffer (T f ull ) declines with the growth of the period T . Hence, larger T would make the sender spend more time in the attack-free phase with a sending rate of C and less time in the bottleneck-congested phase with a rather low sending rate, which eventually results in higher throughput P.
In summary, the throughput P always declines with the decrease of the period T as long as the attack is successful. This is why we minimize T to achieve the lowest P in (21) .
Next, we discuss how the length of an outage L influences the attack effect P. In (17) , (18) we have mathematically proved that L has no direct impact on P except that it must be larger than the lower bound L * T . We validate this conclusion through simulation (omitted here) and find that P indeed decreases very slowly with the growth of L in general cases. As a result, attacker should set L = L * T (or a little larger) for launching a successful attack while keeping the average attack rate low.
Afterwards, we discuss how to mitigate shrew attack by reconfiguring the network resources including the propagation delay, the number of the flows, the bottleneck bandwidth, and the bottleneck buffer size.
Firstly, decreasing the flows' (equivalent) delay d is the most obvious mitigation strategy. By doing so, the lasting time of every round will be shortened as shown by (14) . With the inter-burst period T being unchanged, the TCP senders can experience more rounds and transmit more packets between two outages, thus have higher throughput.
Secondly, increasing the number of TCP flows N is also an obvious way to shrew attack mitigation. As (13) indicates, more flows (especially the ones with low delays) can refill the bottleneck link more quickly and thus recover the throughput P.
Thirdly, on the conditions that (a) the attack configuration stays unaltered, (b) the flows' (equivalent) delay d satisfies 2d N/C (which is common in the modern Internet), and (c) W k < N/b +2dC (which happens when the burst period T is small enough, as illustrated by Fig. 3) , the TCP throughput will increase as the bottleneck bandwidth C and the buffer size B declines. This interesting conclusion can be proved as follows.
At first we review Fig. 3 and see that an inter-burst period T consists of four parts, i.e., the time that the attacker takes to fill the bottleneck buffer (T f ull ), the interval between the buffer overflows and the sender stops sliding window (T stop ), the retransmission timeout (minRTO), and the interval from the beginning of slow start to the beginning of the next outage (i.e., the recovery period, T r ). Apparently, T f ull and T stop will decrease if the bottleneck bandwidth C or the buffer size B decrease. In addition, minRTO is always 1s. Hence, as C or B declines, T r will increase, namely, the senders will have more time to recover their sending rate.
Then we substitute the condition of 2d N/C and W k < N/b+2dC into (14) , and find that the TCP flows' RTTs T rrt (i) always equal 2d + (b − 1)D in the first round and equal 2d in the other rounds during the recovery period. It means that the decrement of C or B has no effect on TCP flows' RTTs when 2d N/C and W k < N/b + 2d. In sum, decreasing the bandwidth C and the buffer size B (as long as 2d N/C and W k < N/b + 2dC) will give the TCP flows more attack-free recovery time and will not alter the flows' RTTs. Consequentially, the flows can transmit more packets during an inter-burst period and thus have higher throughput. Of course, such throughput increment is usually insignificant as shown by simulation results (omitted here).
At last, larger bottleneck buffer B or delay d can mitigate shrew attack from a different angle, i.e., by making the attack failed. To be specific, from (18), (20) and (22) it can be seen that the lower bounds for burst length and burst period rise with the increment of B or d. In turn, the attack will end up unsuccessful if B or d is sufficiently raised. In this case, the TCP sender can enter congestion avoidance instead of timeout after outages, which by nature leads to higher throughput.
V. THE EMPIRICAL VALIDATIONS OF THE PROPOSED MATHEMATICAL MODEL AND ITS EXTENSIONS
In this section, we validate the proposed model for attack effect P as well as the expressions for the conditional minimum of DoS period T * L and the global minimum of burst length L min by comparing our theoretical estimations with the simulation results. The accuracy of our analytic results is quantified by relative error, which is calculated as |Theoretical Result -Empirical Result|/Empirical Result.
The general topology and settings of the simulation network are shown in Fig. 5 , following [1] . Here, minRTO is set to its default value, 1s [1] , [18] , and TCP receiver would delay at most 200ms (i.e., D = 200ms) to feedback ACK to TCP sender. The simulation chooses FTP as the application layer protocol to ensure that TCP always has data to send.
A. Validating the Mathematical Model for Attack Effect P
We now validate our model for attack effect with various attack patterns and network environments. Specifically, we perform experiments in the following 3 network topologies that correspond to our modeling scenarios in section III:
• Simulation Scenario 1: There is only one TCP flow in the network. The flow's delay will be specified later.
• Simulation Scenario 2: There are three TCP flows in the network and their delays are identical (specified later). [1, 2] as we mentioned in section II. Therefore, we have 6 different simulation cases in total, which constitute a wide range of network environments to ensure the representative of the results obtained later. Fig. 6 depicts the relative error between the attack effect P obtained from simulation and from our model's prediction in the 6 simulation cases as a function of the burst length L. We begin L with B/C + 3d, which is slightly larger than (22)) for the success of the attacks. For every L, we set the period T to 20 values uni-
, where T * L is the lower bound of T and is obtained from simulation. We use these settings of L and T to capture the usual attack patterns of shrew DoS. Moreover, we set the one-way propagation delay d to 10ms, 30ms, 50ms, 70ms, and 90ms in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 respectively to cover the most common delays in the Internet [15] , whereas we fix the delays of the 20 flows in Scenario 3 to d 1 = 10ms, d 2 = 18ms, d 3 = 26ms, …, d 20 = 170ms as discussed earlier. Therefore, for a given L in Fig. 6 we can derive 100 relative errors from the 100 different combinations of T and d for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, and 20 relative errors from the 20 different values of T for Scenario 3. We average these relative errors to measure the relative error for the given L in a simulation case. Observe that the relative errors generally stay around 10% in all 6 simulation cases, regardless of the complexity of the topologies, the value of L, or the value of b. To be specific, the maximal relative errors in the 6 simulation cases are merely 13.89%, 9.25%, 14.90%, 13.44%, 12.89%, and 13.21% respectively. And although the relative error of our predictions becomes slightly larger with the growth of L, it is still rather low even at L = 3(B/C + 3d). Considering that 3(B/C + 3d) is already very large for a low-rate shrew attack, we conclude that our model can accurately predict attack effect P for various network environments and attack patterns.
Then we compare our baseline model with the one from [1] in Scenario 1, as exhibited in Fig. 7 . We choose [1] 's model as the benchmark because all the subsequent models (e.g., the ones in [12] [13] [14] ) were essentially revised A comparison between our model and the model from [1] in Scenario 1. Every data point is the average value of 260 relative errors obtained by varying L from B/C + 3d to 3(B/C + 3d) and varying T from T * L (the minimum T for given L) to 2T * L .
from it and ignored TCP's congestion window adaptation mechanism likewise. We vary burst length L and period T as we did in Fig. 6 , and use the average value of the obtained 260 relative errors for every given delay d in Fig. 7 . Observe that both of the two models are accurate when d is small (less than 30ms [1] assumed that the bottleneck buffer would overflow instantly when an outage begins (i.e., T f ull = 0), as well as the TCP sender could immediately restore its cwnd after timeout (i.e., T r = 0). However, as indicated by (9) and (6), the time for the attacker to fill the bottleneck buffer (T f ull ) and the time for the sender to recover its cwnd (T r ) actually increase with d or b. Thus when d and b are large (e.g., d = 90ms and b = 2), the assumptions of T f ull = 0 and T r = 0 will cause a serious overestimation of the TCP sender's cwnd, and eventually the overestimation of the TCP throughput P. In contrary, our model can capture the impact of T f ull (in (9)) and T r (in (6)) on attack effect, so its relative error stays nearly 10% (the mean value is 10.34%) for different values of d and b. Considering that more than half of the Internet delays are around 90ms [15] , our model is more applicable in realistic networks.
B. Validating the Analytic Expression of T * L
Now we validate the analytic expression of the minimum attack period for given burst length (T * L ) in (20) , as shown in Fig. 8 . Observe that most of the relative errors are smaller than 10% and they are irrelevant with the heterogeneity of the flows, the value of L or the value of b. In particular, when b = 1, the relative error has a mean value of 5.72% and a maximum of 13.38% (in the "Scenario 3, b = 1"), whereas when b = 2, the relative error has a mean value of 5.99% and a maximum of 13.70% (in the "Scenario 2, b = 2"). Such results demonstrate that (20) can accurately predict T * L for various network environments and attack patterns.
We need not to validate the analytic expression of the minimum length of outage (L * T ) as it is completely equivalent to the one of T * L . The accuracy of our predictions for T * L ensures that our predictions for L * T will also be accurate.
C. Validating the Analytic Expression of L min
At last we validate the analytic expression of the global minimum peak length L min in (22) . We use the ratio between the aggregate (under-attack) throughput of the flows that timeout after every outage and the aggregate throughput of all the flows (i.e., P) to quantify how successful the attack is. We refer to this ratio as attack-success index and denote it by S · S = 1 means that all TCP flows enter timeout after every outage and thus the attack is strictly successful.
We still use the relative error to quantify the accuracy of (22)'s predictions for L min , as shown in Fig. 9 . The simulation cases from 1 to 6 correspond to Scenario 1, 2, 3 with b = 1 and 2 respectively. We consider two different views about the success of an attack. The first view is that S ≥ 0.90 is sufficient to demonstrate the success of an attack, and we refer to it as loose success. The second view is that an attack is successful only if S = 1, and we refer to it as strict success.
It can be seen that the predictions of (22) are rather accurate except the ones in Scenario 3 when strict success is required. This result can be explained as follows. In single-flow scenario (e.g., Scenario 1) or homogeneous-flows scenario (e.g., Scenario 2), the TCP flow(s) always timeout synchronously as discussed in section III, so loose success and strict success are basically the same for those two scenarios. However in some heterogeneous-flows scenarios such as Scenario 3, the high-delay flows, although share few bottleneck bandwidth, will only timeout under attacks with very large burst length L. In other words, strict success (S = 1) in Scenario 3 can only be achieved when L is much larger than the theoretical prediction of L min , which thereby leads to the comparatively high relative error of (22) in this case.
To summarize, (22) can accurately predict L min in singleflow scenario and homogeneous-flows scenario, as well as in heterogeneous-flows scenario if only loose success is required, but may be less accurate for some heterogeneous-flows scenarios where strict success is required.
VI. SOME DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR SHREW ATTACK
In section IV we have discussed how to mitigate shrew attack by reconfiguring the network sources (including the TCP flows' propagation delay, the number of the TCP flows, the bottleneck bandwidth, and the bottleneck buffer size). Here we apply one of these analytic results to design a simple defense strategy, i.e., mitigating shrew attack by increasing the bottleneck buffer size.
Permanently increasing the buffer size may bring some drawbacks [21] , [22] , so our strategy is increasing the buffer only when under a shrew attack, and resuming it to the normal value once the attack is over. This strategy is feasible since the buffer is essentially a part of the bottleneck router's memory, which by nature can be easily allocated and freed. One of the greatest advantages of our strategy is the high fault-tolerance. For instance, even if the defense system falsely considers that it is under attack and thereby increases B, in general the overall TCP performance won't be affected significantly [21] - [23] .
Based on this strategy, we build up a defense system in Fig. 10 . This system is deployed in the bottleneck router. The collector samples the incoming packets and feeds the statistic data to the analyzer. The analyzer decides whether the bottleneck is under a shrew DoS attack at present. If true, the router will increase its buffer size from B to B + B to mitigate this attack; otherwise, the router will resume its buffer size to B. The analyzer is definitely the key component of the whole system. If it can make the decisions with high accuracy and low latency (some existing detection algorithms [24] , [25] may be applied to achieve this goal), then the whole defense system is able to mitigate shrew attack without degrading attack-free TCP performance.
We run simulations to evaluate the above defense system. In the experiments, we deploy the defense system in Scenario 3 (for its representative of the Internet flows) and Fig. 11 . The normalized throughput increment induced by our defense system as a function of peak length L. The bottleneck buffer is set to B + B , where B is the original bottleneck buffer size. The DoS period T is set to T * L (the minimum T for given L). The burst length L is normalized by B/C + 3d, where C is the bottleneck bandwidth and d is the equivalent delay calculated by (19) . assault the network with shrew attacks. In particular, we vary the burst length L and set the DoS period T to its minimum T * L (which is obtained experimentally before deploying the defense system) to achieve the highest attack effect, so that we can see the performance of our defense system in the worst cases. Since our major concern is to validate the idea of temporarily increasing the bottleneck buffer size, we assume that the defense system's analyzer is always able to detect shrew attack accurately.
The effectiveness of our defense system is quantified by the difference between the TCP throughput before and after deploying the system, and then normalized by the bottleneck bandwidth C, as shown in Fig. 11 . Observe that the overall throughout increment rapidly rises with the growth of the added buffer (i.e., B ) for either b = 1 or b = 2. For instance, the mean throughput increment is 0.21C when B = 0.5B, yet it grows to 0.41C when B = 2B. This result indicates that the shrew attack can be substantially weakened so long as B is large enough. It also means that B can be tuned to trade off between the defense effectiveness and the cost of hardware. Next, observe that although larger burst length L (and hence higher average attack rate) can reduce the throughput increment, such reduction is usually insignificant. Take the case of B = 2B, b = 1 as an example. The throughput increment is 0.45C when L = B/C + 3d, and it is still as high as 0.32C when L = 3(B/C + 3d). Combining the above observations, we conclude that our defense strategy is able to effectively mitigate shrew attack. And to breach this strategy, the attacker must greatly increase its sending rate, which, however, would make the attack more vulnerable to traditional DDoS defense strategies. More detailed discussions are beyond the scope of this paper.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we propose a mathematical model for deriving shrew attack's effect and revealing the attack's properties. Such model allows us to explore different attack patterns that may be utilized by an attacker, so that more effective defense strategies can be designed accordingly. Different from previous works, the proposed model takes into account the explicit behaviors of TCP's congestion window adaptation mechanism, so it can comprehensively evaluate attack effect from both attack pattern and network environment. The simulation results indicate that the relative error of our model remains around 10% for most attack patterns and network environments, whereas the benchmark model in previous works (which ignored congestion window adaptation mechanism) has a mean relative error of 69.57% and a maximum of 186.17%.
In addition, our model uncovers some novel properties of shrew attack, such as the minimum DoS period for given peak length (T * L ) and the global minimum peak length (L min ). The former reveals the highest throughput degradation can be caused by shrew attack, whereas the latter shows the lowest attack cost to launch a successful attack. With these analytic deductions, we are able to discover the way of tuning the attack parameters to improve the attack effect in a given network environment, and the way of reconfiguring the network resources (e.g., the bandwidth of bottleneck link, the buffer size, etc.) to mitigate shrew DoS with given attack pattern. Moreover, we are able to design a simple defense strategy based on our theoretical results, i.e., mitigating shrew attack by temporarily increasing the bottleneck buffer size. Simulation demonstrates that this strategy can recover nearly half of the bottleneck transmission rate for general attack patterns, and to breach it the attacker must exploit "high-rate" data streams.
At last, our model indicates that some conclusions in [1] turn out to be rather inaccurate in some cases (e.g., we find that [1] seriously underestimated the stealthy nature of shrew attack). One of the consequences is that many existing defense strategies, especially the ones that were designed and validated on the basis of those inaccurate conclusions, maybe in fact unable to defend against shrew attack effectively. We plan to further study this problem in the future.
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